SOUTH CAROLINA AMERICAN REVOLUTION STATISTICS AND HISTORY “CAPSULES”

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SOUTH CAROLINA REVOLUTIONARY WAR STATISTICS

DEFENSE OF FORT MOULTRIE, SC – JUNE 28, 1776

BATTLE OF STONO FERRY – JUNE 20, 1779

SIEGE OF CHARLESTON – MARCH 29 TO MAY12, 1780

BATTLE OF WAXHAWS ( BUFFORD’S MASSACRE) – MAY 29, 1780

BATTLE OF CAMDEN – AUGUST 16, 1780

BATTLE OF FISHING CREEK – AUGUST 18, 1780

BATTLE OF HOBKIRK’S HILL (SECOND BATTLE OF CAMDEN) – APRIL 25, 1781

BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS – SEPTEMBER 8, 1781

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DEFENSE OF FORT MOULTRIE, SOUTH CAROLINA – JUNE 28, 1776

In 1776, the British still did not understand how important it was for them to develop a strategy to defend the uprising in the Colonies. The British knew the Colonies had little time to organize their rebellion and there were still many loyalists who argued against rebellion. They did not give enough credit to the colonists’ anger at being taxed without representation. They did not realize the determination of the Patriots to win their freedom from the oppressive taxation of King George III. The British only tried to stop the Patriots from getting out of hand. In the summer of 1775 the British Army decided they needed to develop strength in the southern colonies in order to protect their interests in the New England colonies. They decided to take control of Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. On June 28, 1776, Sir Henry Clinton sent British troops aboard the ship “Thunder” to attack the Continental Army at Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island. Three other warships ran aground because Sir Clinton did not realize the shallowness of the waters in the channel.

They sent 100 British soldiers by small boat to the shore to siege Fort Moultrie. The Patriots were able to resist the attack and after thirteen hours of intense fighting, the British admitted defeat and the ships drifted out to sea. The British who were killed or wounded outnumbered the Patriot casualties five to one. This was a terrible defeat to the British who thought their power was so strong. It wasn’t until May 9, 1780, almost four years later, that the British were able to take control of Charleston by setting the town on fire and force the rebels to surrender.

An interesting story from this battle is about William Jasper, who was from Georgia and had been recruited by Francis Marion to join the Second South Carolina Regiment. Fort Moultrie’s flag was blue with a white crescent and it flew through most of the battle letting nearby citizens know that the Patriots were still in control of the fort. When a shot took down the flag, William Jasper shouted to his commanding officer, “Colonel, don’t let us fight without our flag?” When Colonel Moultrie replied, “How can you help it? The staff is gone,” Jasper climbed over the wall to the fort and ran out in sight of the British to retrieve the flag. When he returned it safely to the fort, he pinned it to the wall as though it were hanging, and returned to fighting. Jasper was offered a commission, but turned it down to be a scout for the American forces. He made several trips into enemy lines and always returned with valuable information. William Jasper died at Savannah, Georgia in 1779 while raising the colors of the Second South Carolina Regiment on the British lines. A statute in his memories stands in one of Savannah’s squares. There are eight counties and seven cities and towns in our nation that are named after him. In Charleston, South Carolina, there is also a statute of him with his eyes staring at the harbor. It is inscribed with the words:

“WE SHALL NOT FIGHT WITHOUT OUR FLAG.”

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BATTLE OF STONO FERRY – JUNE 20, 1779

In 1778, facing a stalemate in the northern colonies, Lord George Germain, and North America Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton, turned their attention to the southern colonies. Understanding the strong Loyalist sentiment in the South, the British counted on their help to rise up to suppress and defeat American patriots. British forces dispatched Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell and his troops from New York in November 1778 to capture Savannah, reinforced by Brigadier General Augustine Prevost who marched north from Saint Augustine, Florida. Campbell made landfall outside of Savannah on December 23 and successfully captured the city six days later.  On April 20, 1779, Patriot Major General Benjamin Lincoln  moved most of his forces from Purrysburg to Augusta to stage an attack on Savannah. Meanwhile, he ordered Brigadier General William Moultrie to remain at Black Swamp, about twenty-five miles from Purrysburg, with 1,200 men made up of the 2nd and 5th South Carolina and South Carolina militia.   

General Augustine Prevost had assumed command of the British forces and established headquarters at Ebenezer on the Georgia side of Savannah River. Lincoln soon realized that Prevost was planning to cross into South Carolina but assumed that this maneuver was simply to draw him out of Augusta. The Swiss General confronted Moultrie at the port of Charles Town in May but caught wind of Lincoln’s approach from the south. Prevost could not return to Georgia in the same manner as he arrived, so he decided to use the Sea Islands as a route of withdrawal until they could get picked up by the British navy. By May 21, Prevost’s troops were distributed through John’s Island and James Island awaiting passage by boat to Port Royal, leaving a rear guard at Stono Ferry commanded by Lt. Colonel John Maitland. At the mainland landing of Stono Ferry, Maitland and his troops erected three redoubts with several cannons and about 800 British, Loyalist and Hessian troops enclosed by an abatis, trees with sharpened branches pointing outward. The row galley Thunder provided support from the river. On May 31, a reconnaissance mission of 1,000 troops, led by Brigadier General Isaac Huger and Casimir Pulaski, approached the British position but reported back that the British post was too strong to attack. Lincoln understood he had no military imperative to attack Stono Ferry, but felt he needed a victory to sustain the morale of his troops and the civilians. Any action would have to come soon because many of his troops were Virginia and North Carolina militiamen whose enlistments were about to expire. 

After a council of war on June 19, 1779, at his camp near Wallace Bridge, about three miles northeast of the British camp, Lincoln decided to attack early the next morning. He assembled 1,200 men, both Continental, and militia soldiers and started his advance to Stono Ferry at midnight. On June 17, Lincoln instructed Moultrie “to throw over on James Island all the troops which can be spared from town.” By the morning of June 20, he had 700 men on James Island. About an hour after daybreak, Lincoln formed his lines about three-quarters of a mile from the British encampment, forcing his men, mostly from the Carolinas and Virginia, to march through woods.  As the Americans advanced they made contact with the British pickets at 7:00 am and easily drove them into the camp. Henderson’s 6th South Carolina encountered the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment of Foot (Highlanders) who had deployed outside of the British camp. The Highlanders suffered heavy casualties as all of their officers were either killed or wounded and fell back to the camp. Of the two companies of the Highlanders, only twelve men made it back. 

The British troops waited until the Americans were within sixty yards of the abatis. The rest of the South Carolina and North Carolina brigades were much less successful in attacking as they found the creek and marsh in front of the British camp unexpectedly difficult to cross. On the American right, the militia had good success against the Hessians, but Maitland rallied them to stop the militia’s progress. The North Carolina brigade charged but found the abatis impenetrable, with a deep ravine preventing their getting around it. The cannons had little effect on the British fortifications protecting the Hessians and the Royal North Carolina Regiment. Fire from the row galley Thunder drove back some of the Americans on the right wing, and the sight of British reinforcements approaching on the causeway from Johns Island convinced Lincoln to order a retreat. 

Moultrie’s assignment was to have detained the British on Johns Island, but historians debate on whether his failure to do so lay with poor weather conditions or his own incompetence. On seeing the American retreat, Maitland advanced his line in pursuit but broke off as the American cavalry in reserve engaged. According to Lincoln: “The retreat was conducted in an orderly and regular manner, our platoons frequently facing about and firing by the word of command upon their pursuers, who, however, very soon gave over the chase.” 

In the battle, which lasted for fifty-six minutes, 34 Americans were killed, 113 were wounded, and 155 were missing. Of the 34 Americans, three were key officers. Most notable was Colonel Owen Roberts of the 4th South Carolina Regiment (artillery) who suffered a shattered leg from a British artillery shell. Amongst the American wounded was Major William R. Davie, General Isaac Huger, and Colonel Laumoy, a French engineer. Hugh Jackson, older brother of future President Andrew Jackson, died shortly after the battle from heat and fatigue.3 The British lost 26 killed, 93 wounded, and one missing.

The Battle of Stono Ferry had little, if any, impact on Germain’s southern strategy or the Revolutionary War. Prevost’s rearguard under Maitland abandoned the redoubts as intended and retreated down the coast to Beaufort, while the rest of Prevost’s forces continued to Savannah.

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SIEGE OF CHARLESTON – MARCH 29 TO MAY12, 1780

The 1780 siege of Charleston was a decisive success for the British during the War of the American Revolution as they shifted their strategy to focus on the southern theater. Capture of the city and its harbor gave them a vital base from which to conduct operations in their attempt to rally the support of American Loyalists  and reconquer the southern states. Conversely, the loss of Charleston was a painful blow to the American cause, made even worse by the capture of over 2,500 Continentals and numerous vital weapons and supplies.

The stalemate in the northern theater of the war after 1778-1779 led the British leadership to renew its interest in the southern theater. The British remained convinced that the erstwhile southern colonies were full of American Loyalists waiting for British authorities to liberate them from Patriot rule. Patriot forces had repelled attempts to gain a foothold in the southern colonies at Moore’s Creek Bridge and Charleston in 1776, but the successful capture of Savannah, Georgia, at the end of 1778 had restored British hopes that Charleston could be captured and that this success would swell Loyalist support for the British campaign to subdue the rebellion.

The Americans, meanwhile, knew that Charleston was a likely target for the British following the capture of Savannah. Major General Benjamin Lincoln was given command of the defense of Charleston in September 1779. In his initial instructions to Lincoln, General George Washington warned him of the impending British attack, but expressed his regrets that he could not offer any military assistance because of the need to maintain adequate Continental forces around the northern British stronghold in New York City. When Lincoln arrived, many of the fortresses defending Charleston’s harbor were in disrepair, and the fortifications on its western and southern sides (the sides facing the city’s landward approaches) were unfinished. Lincoln and his subordinates worked diligently to repair the fortifications around the city and the Continental Army leadership beseeched the southern states to provide men and materiel to defend Charleston.

Lt. General Sir Henry Clinton‘s expeditionary force of some 13,500 British and German soldiers departed New York just after Christmas in 1779 and made its way through stormy winter weather to the Savannah River by the end of January 1780. The force then maneuvered up the coast and over land routes to approach Charleston from its weaker southern and western sides, bypassing the seaward defenses at Fort Moultrie that had rebuffed the 1776 British assault.

American partisan forces under commanders like Francis Marion harassed the British forces, and Lincoln dispatched a force of 350 dragoons and militia under Brigadier General Isaac Huger to the crossroads at Monck’s Corner 30 miles north of Charleston to keep his lines of communication open. There was little else the American forces could do. Washington had advised to Lincoln to abandon the city to save his force of Continentals if necessary, but the civilian leadership of Charleston convinced Lincoln to stay. At the end of March, British forces under Earl Charles Cornwallis crossed over the Ashley River about 14 miles northwest of Charleston and on April 1, 1780 British forces began digging siege lines across the neck of the Charleston peninsula. Clinton hoped that a methodical siege would capture Charleston and its harbor intact, earning the loyalty of the civilian population and facilitating British use as a base of operations.

The American defenders fought the encroaching British siege works, even resorting to loading cannon with metal refuse and broken glass to conserve meager ammunition stocks. On April 9, the British ships supporting the siege forced their way into the harbor past Fort Moultrie and began shelling the city. Commodore Abraham Whipple, the commander of the small American naval force, scuttled his fleet to obstruct the harbor. At the urging of Charleston’s civilian leaders, Lincoln refused British demands to surrender, but a few days later the South Carolina government secretly fled the city. On the evening of April 13, a British cavalry raid led by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton routed Huger’s forces at Monck’s Corner, capturing 400 horses and tightening the British stranglehold on the city. The next day, British siege guns began firing on Charleston from the north.

On April 22, Clinton refused Lincoln’s proposal to surrender Charleston in exchange for allowing the Continental forces defending it to go free. Two days later, an American sortie into the first row of British entrenchments inflicted 50 casualties and netted a dozen prisoners, but did little to halt the siege. Well aware that Charleston’s capture was imminent, Lincoln requested permission from Charleston’s remaining civilian leadership to evacuate his force of Continentals. The city’s leaders responded by threatening to destroy any boats used in an evacuation attempt. As April turned to May, Fort Moultrie and its garrison of 200 defenders surrendered to the British. On May 11, the British began firing upon Charleston with heated shells, resulting in several fires, and Charleston’s civilian authorities at last urged Lincoln to surrender to the British, regardless of the terms.

The surrender terms were indeed harsh by the standards of the day. Lincoln and his command were refused the honors of war, and many of the 2,500 Continentals who surrendered would not survive their imprisonment. The British captured over 300 cannons and about 6,000 muskets, along with vast stores of gunpowder. Overall, the casualties in the siege were relatively light, with fewer than 300 killed and wounded on either side; an accidental explosion in a magazine after the surrender killed twice as many as died in the actual siege.

The results of the British victory, though, were decisive. The British had captured the largest city and best harbor in the southern theater and proceeded to follow up this triumph with victories over other American forces at the Waxhaws and Camden. Their success seemed to rally much of South Carolina’s population to the Loyalist side. Washington and the Americans struggled to find an effective way to counter these setbacks, and it would take over a year of bitter partisan warfare and hard campaigning by Major General Nathanael Greene and others to thwart the British campaign in the south.

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BATTLE OF WAXHAWS (BUFORD’S MASSACRE) – MAY 29,1780

The Battle of Waxhaws was a dreadful defeat for the Patriots. However, Americans were able to turn this stinging tactical loss into a propaganda victory, stirring up anti-British sentiment throughout the colonies.

On May 12th, 1780, Charleston fell to the British under the command of Sir Henry Clinton. A column of reinforcements consisting of 380 troops under the command of Colonel Abraham Buford failed to reach the city before its fall and turned about to retreat back north. This force, known as the Third Virginia Detachment, consisted of two companies of the 2nd Virginia Regiment, 40 Virginia Light Dragoons, and two sixpound cannon. As Buford’s detachment travelled north, they met several prominent South Carolina citizens fleeing the British advance.  Even Governor John Rutledge joined the column as it moved towards the North Carolina border.

General Clinton returned to New York, leaving General Charles Lord Cornwallis in command of the Southern Army. Cornwallis learned of Buford’s column and sent a force under Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to catch and destroy the Continentals. Tarleton commanded 230 men of his British Legion, mounted on horseback as dragoons or mounted infantry, 40 members of the 17th Light Dragoons, and one three pound cannon.

Even though the Americans were a week ahead of Tarleton, the aggressive British commander moved his men 150 miles at a rapid pace, catching up with Buford in the afternoon of May 29th, 1780. The area in which the two forces caught sight of each other lies along the border of North and South Carolina, in an area called the Waxhaws.

Tarleton sent ahead a message to Buford, demanding that the Americans surrender, but they refused. Buford then ordered all of his heavy baggage and weapons to continue moving northward.  This included his artillery, which would not play a role in the battle. He then formed a line to stand against the advancing British and Loyalists. His position was in an open wood to the right of the route of march, with all of his infantry in a single line. The American colors were placed in the center of this line. Buford ordered his men to hold their fire until the British were within 10 yards.

Seeing the Rebel line deployed for battle, Tarleton divided his force into three attacking columns. He deployed 60 British Legion dragoons as well as about the same number of mounted infantry as the right column, with the intention of having the mounted infantry dismount and pour fire upon the Americans, pinning them down. At the same time, he formed a center column of his elite troops, the regular soldiers of the 17th Light Dragoons, as well as 40 Legion dragoons, to charge straight towards the American center under the covering fire of the Loyalists to their right. The left column was led by Tarleton himself and consisted of 30 handpicked men of the Legion, ready to sweep the American right flank and drive for their baggage and reserves. Tarleton kept his single cannon in reserve with the remaining Legion Dragoons.

The British attack commenced as soon as all of their troops were in position. Given Colonel Buford’s order to refrain from firing until the British were within 10 yards, the American forces were overrun by the speed and aggressiveness of the British mounted attack. The three columns broke through the thin American line and began cutting down soldiers left and right. Many American survivors of the battle claimed that their comrades were massacred while trying to surrender.

Just as quickly as it had begun, the Battle of Waxhaws was over. British casualties were slight, with 5 killed and 14 wounded. The Americans lost 113 men killed and 203 wounded. Colonel Buford managed to escape from the slaughter. He reported what he saw on the battlefield to Patriot officials and the effect was electrifying. The Battle of Waxhaws became known as “Buford’s Massacre” and Tarleton, already known as an aggressive commander, was condemned as a butcher.

There is much debate as to whether or not these killings took place. The British reported that all wounded of both sides were treated fairly as was custom of the day. While today historians debate the truth behind the claims of the killing of prisoners, the effect in 1780 was dramatic. As the British advanced further into North Carolina, men from all over the South took up arms in order to defeat the butchers of Waxhaws. Men from across the Appalachians, the “Overmountain Men” would take up arms and defeat a Loyalist force at the Battle of King’s Mountain in October, 1780. There they attacked the Loyalist position with cries of “Remember Waxhaws!” Resistance to the British campaign in the South continued to intensify, and in October, 1781, the British Army in the south would finally meet its fate around the Virginia port of Yorktown.

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THE BATTLE OF CAMDEN, SC – AUGUST/16/1780

Fought on August 16, 1780, the Revolutionary War Battle of Camden, South Carolina, pitted American forces under Major General Horatio Gates against a small British field force commanded by Lieutenant General CharleS Lord Cornwallis. Despite numerical superiority, the Patriot forces suffered a humiliating rout, one of the worse defeats in American military history.

After capturing Charleston in May, 1780, British forces established a number of posts in the interior of South Carolina to exert control over the state and to quell rising Patriot militia activity. One of their main bases was at Camden, an important transportation and communications hub in the center of the state. Opposing them by late July were several groups of South Carolina partisans, North Carolina militia troops, and a small nucleus of Maryland and Delaware Continentals. Gates, who three years earlier had stopped another major British invasion at Saratoga, New York, commanded all these Patriot forces.

From North Carolina, Gates quickly moved into South Carolina, where he hoped to take up a defensive position north of Camden in order to compel the British to attack him or quit their strong post there. After a grueling march through a Tory-infested country, Gates brought his tattered troops to Rugeley’s Mills, a dozen miles north of Camden, by August 13. The American force of about four thousand men included twelve hundred veteran Continentals, augmented by three thousand state troops and inexperienced militia units. On August 15, Gates ordered a night march toward Camden, to begin at ten p.m. that night.

Coincidentally, the British also set out from Camden at ten p.m., directly for Gates’ camp. Cornwallis sought to attack the Americans on the march, as they approached his position. The armies blundered into each other early on the morning of August16, and after a brief firefight, the two belligerents waited for daylight. Initially, the British deployed into line with their veteran regiments on their right flank, with cavalry in reserve to exploit success. Gates, too, arranged his forces and therein made a critical mistake. The American commander posted the Continentals, his best troops, on the right flank. On his left, Gates deployed the inexperienced militia, thereby placing them opposite the best troops the British had on the field.

Cornwallis was quick to take advantage of Gates’ improper arrangements. After a few volleys, the redcoats advanced with bayonets leveled, which immediately routed the militia, many of whom threw down their arms and fled the field. While Gates and several of his officers vainly tried to rally the panicked militia, the Continentals fought valiantly on the American right. Despite initial success, they were eventually overwhelmed after the flight of the militia. Hundreds of Continentals were captured, while others fled to safety through the surrounding forests and swamps. Gates managed to regroup the remnants of his command in the coming weeks at Hillsborough, North Carolina, almost two hundred miles away. 

Once news of the defeat became known, Congress moved to replace Gates, whose reputation never fully recovered from the debacle in South Carolina. One general or one battle, however, does not determine the outcome of a campaign or a war. American forces would rally under a new commanding general, Nathanael Greene. Within fifteen months they would confine the British to a few coastal enclaves in the Carolinas and Georgia. Meantime, Cornwallis would march off through North Carolina into Virginia — to another coastal port called Yorktown.

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BATTLE OF FISHING CREEK – AUGUST 18, 1780

The Battle of Fishing Creek was also known as the Battle of Catawba Ford / Sumter’s Defeat / War on Sugar Creek. It was fought near the junction of Fishing Creek and the Catawba River in South Carolina.

British forces under Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton surprised the militia company of Thomas Sumter, killing a significant number, taking about 300 captives, and very nearly capturing Sumter, who some say was asleep at the time of the attack.

• Armies – American Forces was commanded by Col. Thomas Sumter and consisted of about 700 Soldiers and militia. British Forces was commanded by Lt Col. Banastre Tarleton and consisted of about 160 Soldiers and militia.
• Casualties – American casualties were estimated to be 150 killed and 300 captured. British casualties was approximately 16 killed/wounded.
• Outcome – The result of the battle was a British victory. The battle was part of the Southern Theater 1775-82.

Following the routing of Continental Army forces from South Carolina in the May 1780 Battle of Waxhaws, the British “southern strategy” for reconquering the rebellious United States in the Revolutionary War appeared to Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis, the British commander in the south, to be going well. British and Loyalist outposts were established throughout South Carolina and Georgia.

In the absence of Continental Army units in South Carolina, militia commanders like Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter began to form units to contest the British presence. Sumter had been particularly successful in the northern part of the state, making attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock in early August 1780.

In August, a new Continental Army threat began to form in North Carolina, as Major General Horatio Gates began moving a regrouped army formation, accompanied by a large number of militia, south to dispute the British outpost at Camden, South Carolina. Cornwallis moved reinforcements to Camden from Charleston, while Sumter, in some coordination with Gates’ movements, harassed British communication and supply lines. The armies of Gates and Cornwallis met north of Camden on August 16, and Gates was decisively routed.

On August 16, after the Battle of Camden, Captain Nathaniel Martin and a couple of dragoons were sent to warn Sumter of the American loss and to appoint a rendezvous near Charlotte. They would have to march all day to be able to to escape the British. They were loaded down with 100 prisoners, 30 supply wagons, 300 head of cattle and a flock of sheep, taken from the Battle of Wateree Ferry.

They left and moved up the west side of the Wateree River towards Charlotte. Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis learned of Sumter’s movement and ordered Tarleton, with his cavalry of the British Legion, to locate and neutralize Sumter the next morning.

On August 17 , in the early morning, Tarleton set out with 350 men and one cannon. They started up the east side of the Waterlee River. By late that afternoon, Tarleton found out that Sumter was across the river travelling on a parrallel course. One day before, Sumter had twice fallen on British supply convoys, and his forces were slowed by prisoners and 80 wagons of supplies. He was moving north toward Charlotte, North Carolina when he learned of the disaster at Camden. In spite of this news, he failed to take some basic precautions when his column took a break near Fishing Creek

At dusk, Tarleton arrived at the ferry at Rocky Mount and saw the American campfires about one mile west of the river. Tarleton made camp at the ferry and did not light any campfires. He hoped that Sumter would not see his camp and cross there in the morning. Then, Tarleton would be able to attack him at this vunerable position.

On August 18, British scouts informed Tarleton that the Americans were continueing west and not heading to the ferry. He gathered his force, crossed the river, and followed Sumter. He remained undetected all the way to Fishing Creek. Fishing Creek was about 40 miles from Camden.

The British infantry were unable to continue. He pushed forward with 100 mounted dragoons and 60 infantry, with the infantry riding double with the dragoons. They rode for 5 miles until they caught up with the Americans.

Around noon, Tarleton’s advance guard ran into two of Sumter’s scouts. After a few shots, one British and both scouts were killed. The advance guard continued till they came to a hill. On top of it, they saw Sumter’s force resting, without any sentries posted.

The soldier’s arms were all stacked, and all of the men were either sleeping, cooking, or bathing in the Catawba River. Sumter was sleeping on a blanket under a wagon. Tarleton quickly deployed his men and ordered them to charge. Tarleton had surprised Sumter because Sumter’s patrol had reported that all was clear.

During the battle, 150 of Sumter’s men were cut to pieces and about 350 were captured. Sumter, without boots and half dressed, jumped upon an unsaddled horse and escaped. The rest of the American force got behind their wagons and engaged the British. Tarleton got back everything Sumter had captured 3 days before, including 44 supply wagons, 2 “grasshopper” cannons, and 800 horses. He also was able to free some 250 British and Loyalists prisoners.

“When Tarleton arrived at Fishing creek at twelve o’clock, he found the greatest part of his command overpowered by fatigue; the corps could no longer be moved forwards in a compact and servicable state: He therefore determined to separate the cavalry and infantry most able to bear farther hardship, to follow the enemy, whilst the remainder, with the three pounder, took post on an advantageous piece of ground, in order to refresh themselves, and cover the retreat in case of accident.”

The number selected to continue the pursuit did not exceed one hundred legion dragoons and sixty foot soldiers: The light infantry furnished a great proportion of the latter. This detachment moved forwards with great circumspection: No intelligence, except the recent tracks upon the road, occurred for five miles.

Two of the enemy’s vedettes, who were concealed behind some bushes, fired upon the advanced guard as it entered a valley and killed a dragoon of the legion: A circumstance which irritated the foremost of his comrades to such a degree, that they dispatched the two Americans with their sabres before Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton could interpose, or any information be obtained respecting Colonel Sumpter.

A serjeant and four men of the British legion soon afterwards approached the summit of the neighbouring eminence, where instantly halting, they crouched upon their horses, and made a signal to their commanding officer. Tarleton rode forward to the advanced guard, and plainly discovered over the crest of the hill the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes. The decision, and the preparation for the attack, were momentary. The cavalry and infantry were formed into one line, and, giving a general shout, advanced to the charge.

The arms and artillery of the continentals were secured before the men could be assembled: Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was, however, made from behind the waggons, in front of the militia. The numbers, and extensive encampment of the enemy, occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided.

At length, the release of the regulars and the loyal militia, who were confined in the rear of the Americans, enabled Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton to stop the slaughter, and place guards over the prisoners.

The pursuit could not with propriety be pushed very far, the quantity of prisoners upon the spot demanding the immediate attention of great part of the light troops. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton lost no time in sending for the detachment left at Fishing creek, thinking this additional force necessary to repulse any attempt the enemy might make to rescue their friends.

All the men he could assemble were likewise wanted to give assistance to the wounded, and to take charge of the prisoners; the troops who had gained this action having a just claim to some relaxation, in order to refresh themselves after their late vigorous exertions.

Captain Charles Campbell, who commanded the light infantry, was unfortunately killed near the end of the affair. His death cannot be mentioned without regret. He was a young officer, whose conduct and abilities afforded the most flattering prospect that he would be an honour to his country. The loss, otherwise, on the side of the British was inconsiderable; fifteen non-commissioned officers and men, and twenty horses, were killed and wounded.”

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BATTLE OF HOBKIRK’S HILL (SECOND BATTLE OF CAMDEN, SC) – APRIL 25, 1781

After his pyrrhic victory at the Battle of Guilford Court House, British General Charles Lord Cornwallis  began withdrawing towards Wilmington, North Carolina. After initially pursuing Cornwallis’s army, American General Nathaniel Greene turned south and moved back into South Carolina. Greene hoped to draw his opponent into another battle and defeat him on ground favorable to the Continental Army. Cornwallis, however, refused to take the bait, moving instead into Virginia, where his army would ultimately meet disaster at Yorktown.

For his part, Greene chose to focus on the British occupying forces that remained in the South. The British held a chain of outposts that ran from Augusta, Georgia, up through South Carolina. Camden, the site of a catastrophic American defeat in the summer of 1780, lay in the center of the British line. The British garrison at Camden was led by Lt. Col. Francis Rawdon, who had been left in effective command of British forces in the South after the departure of Cornwallis. 

Although Greene attempted to approach Camden in secret, his arrival did not go undetected. The British forces sat behind their fortifications, prepared for an attack by the Americans. Nonetheless, Rawdon was in a precarious position. Not only was his position threatened by Greene, his supply line connecting Camden with Charleston was under attack by Francis Marion‘s partisan band. The British commander was forced to dispatch 500 men under Lt. Col. John Watson Tadwell-Watson to seek out and destroy the legendary “Swamp Fox.” Rawdon was left with 900 men to defend Camden. 

On April 20, with the element of surprise lost, Greene arrayed his forces on a ridge known as Hobkirk’s Hill, a mile and half north of town. Greene commanded 1,551 men, most of whom were regular Continental Army soldiers.  He hoped to draw out and destroy the British army. The next day, Greene heard that Watson’s force was en route back to Camden. In response, the American general detached his artillery and a portion of his infantry to cover the road from Charleston.

On the morning of April 25, a deserter from Greene’s army arrived in Camden and informed Rawdon of the division of the American army. With the Patriots on Hobkirk’s Hill temporarily outnumbered and undefended by artillery, the British commander decided to strike while the iron was hot. He gathered as many of his men as were fit to bear arms, including his musicians, and advanced on Greene’s position. 

At around 11am, as the Americans were settling down to eat, musket fire from Greene’s pickets alerted the Patriots to their peril. From left to right, Rawdon’s line consisted of the King’s American Regiment, the New York Volunteers, and the 63rd Regiment of Foot. In reserve on the left was a unit of convalescents while the Volunteers of Ireland were placed in reserve on the right. Further back was the South Carolina Provincial Regiment as well as a force of dragoons commanded by Maj. John Coffin. Rawdon’s flanks were guarded by Tory riflemen, tasked with sniping at the enemy. 

As Rawdon advanced on Hobkirk’s Hill from the southeast, the American pickets, under the command Capt. Robert Kirkwood, fell back slowly, firing as they went and buying time for Greene to prepare. Suddenly, as the British moved forward, they were showered with a hail of grapeshot. Unbeknownst to Rawdon, Greene had reunited his army early that morning, after discovering that the rumor of Watson’s approach was false. 

Greene, perceiving that Rawdon was attacking along a narrow front, decided to strike the enemy on both flanks. He ordered the 2nd Maryland under Lt. Col. Benjamin Ford to attack the British right while the 1st Virginia under the command of Lt. Col. Richard Campbell assaulted the British left. At the same time, the 1st Maryland under Col. John Gunby and the 2nd Virginia under Lt. Col. Samuel Hawes were to advance from the center. The American left was under the overall command of Col. Otho Williams while the right was led by General Isaac Huger. A unit of cavalry under the command of Lt. Col. William Washington was ordered to flank Rawdon and cut off the British retreat.

While Rawdon recognized his mistake and ordered his reserves to extend his line to the right and left, Greene’s attack initially went as planned. The British were confused by the unexpected presence of American artillery and suffered heavy losses. Some of Rawdon’s men fled before the American attack, allowing Washington’s cavalry to capture as many as 200 prisoners. The Patriot’s attack began to unravel, however, when Gunby ordered his regiment to pause and return fire rather than charge the British with bayonets. After a volley, the Marylanders resumed their advance, only to falter when the officer commanding the regiment’s right was felled by an enemy bullet.   

At that point, Gunby made a costly blunder, ordering his men to fall back and reform. In his report on the battle to Congress, Greene explained that Gunby’s error of judgment “impressed the whole Regiment with an idea of a retreat.” As the 1st Maryland broke, Benjamin Ford of the 2nd Maryland was severely wounded and carried off the field. His men broke as well. Greene wrote that “Both were rallied but it was too late, the enemy had gained the hill.”

On the American left, Hawes’s 1st Virginia had advanced further down the hill, exposing the flank of Campbell’s 2nd Virginia. Campbell’s regiment was the next to break. Greene ordered Hawes to hold off the British attackers while the rest of the American army retreated. Hawes’s men performed admirably, counterattacking Rawdon’s army and buying time for the rest of the Patriot force to reform before they themselves retreated. 

As Greene’s army retreated, some of the American gunners abandoned their pieces, leaving the artillery at risk of capture. Greene sent Capt. James Smith and a detachment of Maryland light infantry to protect the guns and bring them to safety. As Smith’s men were evacuating the artillery, however, they were attacked by Coffin’s dragoons. After a sharp running engagement, Smith’s men were all killed or captured. Nonetheless, the artillery was saved. Greene rallied some of the fleeing gunners and personally assisted them in bringing off his army’s 6 pounders. 

Because of the flight of Greene’s infantry, the American cavalry under William Washington did not have the opportunity to cut off Rawdon’s retreat. The cavalry was, however, able to escape with about 50 of the 200 British prisoners captured earlier in the battle. Washington also helped protect the army from enemy pursuit. 

Interestingly, future President Andrew Jackson was a British prisoner in Camden and was a witness to the battle. He was, at the time, fourteen years old. 

After the battle, Rawdon left Coffin’s dragoons on the field and returned to Camden with the remainder of his army. Later in the afternoon, Greene ordered Washington and Kirkwood to return to the site of the battle in order to rescue the American wounded. They clashed with Coffin and drove him from the battlefield, clearing the way for Greene to reoccupy Hobkirk’s Hill.

Like theBattle of Guilford Court House, Hobkirk’s Hill was a pyrrhic victory for the British, who could ill afford heavy losses. Although sources differ as to exact numbers, it seems that the British lost roughly 260 men in the battle, including at least 38 killed. The Americans lost about 270 men, including at least 19 killed.

Greene was disappointed in the outcome, writing to a correspondent “We should have had Lord Rawdon and his whole command prisoners in three minutes, if Colonel Gunby had not ordered his regiment to retire, the greatest part of which were advancing rapidly at the time they were ordered off. I was almost frantic with vexation at the disappointment.” Aware of Greene’s feeling, Gunby requested a court of inquiry, hoping to clear his name. The court found, however, that Gunby’s “order for the regiment to retire, which broke the line, was extremely improper and unmilitary, and, in all probability the only cause why we did not obtain a complete victory.”

Two weeks after the battle, on May 7, Rawdon was finally rejoined by the force he had detached with orders to seek out Francis Marion. However, while he considered going back on the offensive against Greene, Rawdon ultimately concluded that the American army was too strong and on May 10 he abandoned Camden.

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BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS, SC – SEPTEMBER 8, 1781

In early 1781, Major General Nathaniel Greene, commander of the Southern army in the Continental Army began a campaign to end British control over the South Carolina backcountry. His first major objective was the capture of the British controlled village of Ninety Six. On May 22, 1781, Greene laid siege to the fortified village. After nearly a month Greene became aware that reinforcements under Lord Rawdon were approaching from Charelston. Forces under Greene’s command assaulted Ninety Six on June 18, but were repelled. To avoid facing the force commanded by Rawdon, Greene retreated toward Charlotte, North Carolina. Rawdon pursued Greene for several days, but was compelled to abandon the pursuit because his men were exhausted by days of forced marching and he lacked sufficient supplies to continue. In spite of the fact that Ninety Six was the only remaining inland British outpost after thefall of Augusta, Georgia, Rawdon decided to burn and abandon it, and withdrew the garrison to Charleston. In poor health, Rawdon sailed for England in late August, leaving Charleston under the command of Colonel Alexander Stewart.

On 16 July, Greene moved his army, exhausted by many days of marching and combat, to a campsite on the High Hills of Santee, allowing his main force to rest while awaiting reinforcements. Marion and Sumter continued to harass the British in a “war of posts”. On August 23, his force moved towards Camden to cross the Wateree River, and then Howell’s Ferry to cross the Congaree River. By 4 Sept., they were camped at Fort Motte, then Stoudenmyer’s Plantation on 5-6 Sept.

On 13 Aug., Colonel Stewart had led a force of 2,000-2,300 men from Orangeburg to Thompson’s Plantation, south of the Congaree River. He then fell back to Eutaw Springs on 27 Aug., about 2 miles east of present-day Eutawville, then in Charleston District (but both now in Orangeburg County).

At 4:00 AM on 8 September 1781, Greene’s army began marching from Burdell’s Plantation in the direction of Eutaw Springs, which was 7 miles (11 km) distant. In the van were Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee’s plus 73 infantry and 72 cavalry of South Carolina State troops under Lieutenant Colonel John Henderson and CaptainWade Hampton, respectively. Next in the marching column came 40 cavalry and 200 infantry under Brigadier GeneralFrancis Marion, followed by 150 North Carolina militia under Colonel Francis Marquis de Malmedy  and 307 South Carolina militia led by Brigadier General Andrew Pickens. Continental Army troops formed the center and rear of Greene’s column. These were led by three green North Carolina battalions under Brigadier General Jethro Sumner. Major John Armstrong led a mounted contingent while Lieutenant Colonel John Baptista Ashe and Major Reading Blount directed the foot soldiers. Ashe and Blount served with the 1st North Carolina Regiment, while Armstrong belonged to the 4th North Carolina regiment.

Two Virginia battalions under Lieutenant Colonel Richard Campbell and Major Smith Snead were trailed by ColonelOtho Holland Williams’ two Maryland battalions under Lieutenant ColonelJohn Eager Howard and Major Henry Hardman. Lieutenant Colonel Willam Washington’s mounted men and Captain Robert Kirkwood’s Delaware infantry companies formed the tail of the column. Greene’s force had two 3-pound grasshopper guns under Captain-Lieutenant William Gaines and two 6-pound cannons directed by Captain William Brown. All told, Greene had 1,256 Continental infantry and 300 cavalry, the horsemen mostly divided between Lee and Washington. Lee’s cavalry were led by Major Joseph Egleston and his infantry by Captain Rudolph. Greene’s army numbered 2,400 men of whom 200 were left behind to guard the baggage train.

Stewart had between 1,800 and 2,000 troops on hand. His British regulars were the 3rd, 63rd, and 64th Foot, and John Marjoribanks’ 300-man flank battalion. The last-named unit was made up of the converged flank companies of the19th and 30th Foot. The regulars were supported by two American loyalist. These units were John Harris Cruger’s regular battalion ofDeLancey’s Brigade and John Coffin’s South Carolina Tories, which consisted of about 150 regular infantry and 50 militia cavalry. Stewart’s artillery consisted of two 6-pound, one 4-pound, and one 3-pound cannons plus a swivel gun.

In order to make up for a shortage of bread in his supplies, Stewart had been sending out foraging parties each morning to dig up yams, unarmed except for a small guard detail. At around 8 a.m. on September 8, Captain John Coffin and a detachment of his South Carolina Loyalist cavalry were reconnoitring ahead of Stewart’s main force when he encountered a mounted American scouting party under Major John Armstrong. Coffin pursued Armstrong, who led him into an ambush. Attacked byHenry Lee’s 2nd Partisan Corps, Coffin escaped but left 4 or 5 of his men killed and 40 more captured. The Americans then came across Stewart’s foragers and captured about 400 of them.

Greene’s force, with around 2,200 men, now approached Stewart’s camp while Stewart, warned by Coffin, deployed his force. When the Americans realized they were approaching the British force, they formed three lines, with the militia in front with 2 3-pounders, followed by the Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina Continentals with 2 6-pounders, with the Delaware Regiment and Washington in reserve. The Americans started the attack at 9 AM with artillery and an advance by the militia. This line consisted of, left to right, Hampton, Henderson, Pickens, de Malmedy, Polk, Marion, Lee’s infantry and then Lee’s Cavalry. They were opposed by the British Line consisting of, left to right, Coffin, 64th, 63rd, New Jersey Volunteers, New York Volunteers, 84th, De Lancey’s, 3rd, and Marjoribanks. Hand-to hand combat  ensued when the Militia closed with the British Line. Some militia panicked while some held firm, able to fire 17 times, before ordered back and replaced by the North Carolina Continentals in a ‘passage of lines”.

The North Carolina Continentals halted the British advance but were forced back by a British bayonet charge, only to reform and halt the British a second time. Greene then ordered the Maryland and Virginia Continentals forward in another passage of lines, forcing the British back towards their camp. However, two areas of British resistance remained, one under Maj. Henry Sheridan at the Brick House, which included a swivel gun, and another under Maj. Marjoribanks on the northern flank. Washington’s cavalry tried to dislodge Marjoribanks, but Washington was unhorsed, wounded and taken prisoner, sitting out the remainder of the war. Marjoribanks then retreated towards the Brick House.

The Brick House now became the focal point of the battle, and when an American artillery assault failed, the house gave the British a focal point to regroup, rally and reenter the battle. Maj. Majoribanks then attacked the American flank in the clearing before the house before he was mortally wounded. According to Stewart, the Americans “gave way in all quarters, leaving behind them two brass six pounders and upwards of two hundred killed on the field of action, and sixty prisoners, amongst whom was Colonel Washington, and from every information, about eight hundred wounded…”

According to Otho Wiliams, some plundering of the British camp occurred, while an attack on the British left by Lee’s cavalry failed. At this point, Greene ordered a retreat with all of the wounded. Greene’s army was then able to march back to Burdell’s Plantation incolumn formation. with a cavalry picket covering the orderly retreat. According to Greene, “Nothing but the brick house and their strong position at Eutaw’s, hindered the remains of the British army from falling into our hands.”^[

The British casualty return stated the loss as 85 killed, 351 wounded and 257 missing.  However, Greene reported that he had captured 500 prisoners, including 70 wounded.  When Stewart moved camp on September 9, he left 54 of his wounded behind with a surgeon to attend them. These men were included in Stewart’s casualty report under the category “wounded” but the remaining 16 wounded captured by Greene would have been returned as “missing”. The disparity between Stewart’s report of 257 missing and Greene’s figure of 500 prisoners may be due to Stewart regarding the capture of his foraging party as a separate engagement and not included in the British losses in his casualty return for the battle.  Including the loss of the foraging party, and counting the 54 wounded men whom Stewart decided to leave behind on September 9 in the “wounded prisoners” category instead of as “wounded”, this gives total British casualties of 85 killed, 297 wounded, 70 wounded prisoners and 430 other prisoners.

There were three successive versions of the American casualty return. The first, compiled soon after the battle, gave 251 killed, 367 wounded and 74 missing. The second, compiled somewhat later and published by the Continental Congress, reduced the losses to 138 killed, 375 wounded and 41 missing. The third and final revision, compiled on September 25, 1781, arrived at figures of 119 killed, 382 wounded and 78 missing.The British took 60 prisoners, including the wounded Colonel William Washington, and two artillery pieces.

Rain prevented a continuation of battle the next day. Instead, Stewart buried his dead, destroyed supplies, including 1000 muskets, and retreated towards Monck’s Corner, leaving behind 70 wounded. Greene pursued Stewart as far as Martin’s Tavern near Ferguson’s Swamp. At this point, 11 Sept., Stewart was within range of support from the British garrison in Charleston.^[8]:79–80

Stewart’s letter to Cornwallis on 11 Sept. 1781 states,

With particular satisfaction I have the honour to inform your lordship, that on the 8th instant I was attacked by the rebel General Greene, with all the force he could collect in this province and North Carolina, and after an obstinate engagement, which lasted near two hours, I totally defeated him, and took two six pounders.”

The British were forced to retreat to Charleston

Greene’s letter to Washington on 17 Sept. 1781 states,

Be far the most obstinate fight I ever saw. Victory was ours, and had it not been for one of those little incidents which frequently happen in the progress of war, we should have taken the whole British Army.”

The claim of several historians that the British won the battle is challenged by Christine Swager in her book The Valiant Died: The Battle of Eutaw Springs September 8, 1781. The book argues that, first, at the end of the battle, the British held the majority, but not the entirety, of the field where the main battle took place. Greene held part of the field where the initial skirmish spilled out of the woods into the clearings. Swager also argues that Greene meant to re-engage the enemy on the following day, but was prevented from doing so because the excessively wet weather conditions negated much of his firepower.

Neither army left the vicinity for at least a full day following the battle. When Greene withdrew, he left a strong picket to oppose a possible British advance, while Stewart withdrew the remnants of his force towards Charleston. His rear was apparently under constant fire at least until meeting with reinforcements near Monck’s Corner.

Despite winning a tactical victory, the British lost strategically. Their inability to stop Greene’s continuing operations forced them to abandon most of their conquests in the South, leaving them in control of a small number of isolated enclaves at Wilmmington, Charleston, and Savannah. The British attempt to pacify the South with Loyalist support had failed even before Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown.

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